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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently the United Kingdom handed Hong Kong over to China. The
Joint Declaration' and the Basic Law 2 provide that the local Hong Kong
government shall enjoy a "high degree of autonomy" from the central
government in China. However, it is well recognized that such autonomy
can only be realized in the presence of strong local institutions -institutions
that will resist intervention by China and exercise their powers in the interest
of Hong Kong.
Thus far, Hong Kong's main governmental institutions-the Chief
Executive, the legislature, and the judiciary-hae not established themselves
as particularly strong defenders of local autonomy. The first Chief
Executive (appointed by the Chinese government) has been criticised for
consulting Beijing on matters that are supposed to be outside its supervision.3
The Provisional Legislative Council (appointed because China dissolved
Hong Kong's elected legislature) has also been extremely docile and has
largely complied with China's wishes. When elections are held in the spring
of 1998, Hong Kong can expect more assertive legislators. But as a result
of the election law enacted by the Provisional Legislative Council, even the
elected Legislative Council will be far less democratic than the one elected
in 1995.' Moreover, its power to check the executive branch is quite limited
* Associate Professor, School of Professional and Continuing Education, University ofHong Kong. B.A.,
University of Chicago, 1981; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1984; Postgraduate Diploma in the Law of the
People's Republic of China, University of Hong Kong, 1994.
1. The Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Government of the People's Republic ofChina on the Question ofHong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984,
U.K.-P.R.C. [hereinafter Joint Declaration], reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1371.
2. BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, 1990 [hereinafter BASIC LAW], reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1519 (1990).
3. See Peter Wesley-Smith, The SAR Constitution: Law or Politics?, 27 H.K. L.J. 125, 12728 (1997).
4. The legislature will include 20 members elected from geographic constituencies, 30 by "functional
constituencies" and 10 by an election committee. In the 1995 elections, the functional constituencies
were significantly widened (so that every working person could vote in one). However, for the 1998
elections, the functional constituencies have been narrowed again to small elitist groups. This is
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under the Basic Law.5 Recent dicta by the Court of Appeal appears to reflect
an unwillingness of the judiciary to check the actions of the central
government. 6 Therefore, the judiciary is also looking rather weak at the
moment.
In such an atmosphere, it is crucial that Hong Kong's non-governmental
institutions continue to be strong, independent, and willing to criticize the
local and central governments. As Professor Yash Ghai has argued, the
existence of a "vibrant civil society" is one advantage that Hong Kong has
in its fight to avoid rigid control by China.' Academia and the legal
profession are important elements of that civil society. If these two
institutions (and the individuals that work within them) lose their
independence, then Hong Kong will lose part of what makes it so different
from the rest of China.
This article thus explores the effect that the transition has had on the
academic community and the legal profession. Section II discusses the
preservation of academic freedom in Hong Kong. Section III addresses the
legal profession, focusing mainly on its independence and the willingness of
lawyers to support causes that are unpopular with the new regime. Section
IV briefly considers the extent to which Chinese will replace English as the
language of law and higher education, and the potential ramifications of this
development.
particularly significant because any bill, amendment, or motion proposed by a member of the
Legislative Council (as opposed to the government) must be approved by a simple majority of both
groups of representatives (the functional constituency representatives and the other representatives).
BASIC LAW, supra note 2, Annex II.
5. See BASIC LAW, supra note 2, art. 74.
6. In HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David, [1997] 2 H.K.C. 315, the defendants argued that the offense that
they had been charged with (the common law offense of conspiracy to pervert the course of public
justice) was not a part of the law of Hong Kong after July 1, 1997 because: (1) Article 8 of the Basic
Law (which provides that the common law shall be maintained in Hong Kong) was not self-executing;
and (ii) the Provisional Legislative Council was unlawful and not competent to enact the Reunification
Ordinance (which also stated that the common law survived after July 1, 1997). As the Court of
Appeal decided that the Basic Law itself adopted the common law as part of the law of Hong Kong,
it did not actually have to decide the challenge to the Provisional Legislative Council. However, the
Court of Appeal stated (in obiter dicta) that Hong Kong courts had nojurisdiction to query the validity
of the establishment of the Provisional Legislative Council, as this was an "act of the sovereign."
HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David, [1997] 2 H.K.C. 315. This dicta has created a great deal of
controversy in Hong Kong as it raises the question of whether violations of the Basic Law by the central
government can be addressed in the Hong Kong courts. See Johannes Chan, The Jurisdiction and
Legality of the Provisional Legislative Council, 27 H.K. L.J. 374 (1997); Albert Chen, The Concept
ofJusticiability and the Jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Courts, 27 H.K. L.J. 387 (1997).
7. YASH GHAI, HONG KONG'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION OF CHINESE
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW 174 (1997).
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II. PRESERVING ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN HONG KONG
A. Politics and the Universities
There are currently nine degree granting institutions in Hong Kong,
including six universities. The universities are all government funded and
there is increasing pressure on universities to be "accountable" for the funds
provided. In an effort to create a "buffer" between the government and the
universities, the University Grants Committee (the UGC) was established in
1965. It advises the government on the facilities, development and financial
needs of the universities and is the major decision-maker in allocating
resources among them. The UGC has traditionally included several
members from outside Hong Kong (for example, from the UK, the USA and
Australia). The Chief Executive of Hong Kong now appoints members and
the extent to which the UGC will protect the autonomy of universities
depends to a large degree on its future composition.9
University teachers are acutely aware of the challenges presented by the
resumption of Chinese sovereignty. Since the signing of the Joint
Declaration in 1984, academics (particularly those in law, education and the
social sciences) have devoted an enormous amount of attention to issues
related to the resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong.
Countless research projects and conferences have addressed developments
associated with 1997, and a large body of literature has been produced on the
subject.
Moreover, a significant number of academics have not simply studied
the transition, but rather have become personally involved in Hong Kong's
political and legal developments. Many university teachers have openly
supported the human rights and "pro-democracy" movements. Others have
chosen a very different path, adopting a more "conciliatory" (some would
say "pro-China") position.
In and of itself, this divergence of views would be entirely natural in a
university environment. What has created tension is the fact that many very
senior academics and university leaders (including most of the vice-
8. Gerald Postiglione, Hong Kong's Universities Within the GlobalAcademy in HONG KONG's REUNION
WITH CHINA: GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 240 (Gerald Postiglione & James T.H. Tang eds., 1997).
Universities do raise some of their own money. However, these funds are negligible when compared
to the funding provided by the government.
9. Id. at 241.
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chancellors and presidents of Hong Kong's universities) agreed to be
appointed by China to various bodies overseeing the transition of sovereignty
(including the important Preparatory Committee). Officially, these
university leaders were appointed in their personal capacities and not as
representatives of their institutions, but in reality, their appointments were
widely recognized as a process of "co-option;" a deliberate strategy to
reduce resistance among Hong Kong academics and create an impression that
the universities supported actions taken by China during the transition.'
The academics and administrators who agreed to serve on these bodies
were probably inspired by a variety of motives-including the genuine belief
that a conciliatory approach to China could achieve the best possible deal for
Hong Kong (and their own institutions) under the new regime. Indeed, it is
certainly arguable that the participation of university leaders on these "pro-
China" bodies may benefit their institutions in the long terms-China may feel
less threatened by them and therefore be less inclined to intervene.
In the short term, however, the co-option of academics has created
tension on Hong Kong's campuses. Naturally, academics continually discuss
China's actions toward Hong Kong (such as its decision to dissolve the
elected legislature and replace it with the appointed Provisional Legislative
Council). In debating such issues (whether at a conference or merely over
lunch), one cannot help but be aware of the role played by certain prominent
members of the university community. The group at the next table might
include a member of the Preparatory Committee (which established the
Provisional Legislative Council) or another China-appointed body. Of
course, that same professor might also sit on a university committee
considering applications for promotion or research grants.
This tension will not necessarily disappear now that China has finally
resumed sovereignty. Academics who support the democracy and human
rights movements have opposed many of the actions taken by the Chief
Executive and the Provisional Legislative Council since July 1997. Like
other activists in Hong Kong, they are gearing up for the May 1998 elections
and hope that the elected legislature will provide a more receptive forum for
their views. Yet the Chief Executive has made it clear that he believes there
has been "too much politics" in Hong Kong during the transition. The heads
of our universities may well share that view. They may be anxious that their
institutions not be viewed as sources of resistance to China.
10. For a discussion of the "co-option" process, see Law Wing-Wah, The Accommodation and Resistance
to the Decolonisation, Neocolonisation and Recolonisation of Higher Education in Hong Kong, in
EDUCATION AND POLITICAL TRANSITION: IMPLICATIONS OF HONG KONG'S CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY
5455 (Mark Bray & W.O. Lee eds., 1997).
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University leaders may also receive quiet pressure (from influential
conservatives) to ensure that public funds are not being used to challenge the
local and central governments. Recently, Xu Si-min, a well-known Hong
Kong publisher and member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference, stated publicly that RTHK, Hong Kong's public radio station,
is too critical of the Hong Kong and Chinese governments." He claimed that
he had already raised the issue several times with Hong Kong's Chief
Executive, Tung Chee-hwa. Indeed, one report claimed that Tung receives
at least one complaint a day about RTHK (from government officials and
also from people in the private sector who are well-connected to China).' 2
Their position appears to be that as RTHK is funded by tax revenues it
should be supportive of the Hong Kong and Chinese governments (an
interesting argument given that neither government is elected by the people
who pay the taxes). Of course, Hong Kong's universities are also all
publicly funded and could easily be subjected to the same kinds of pressure.
Thus, academics with views that conflict with those of the new regime
may fear that they will be penalized for their political activities, their
writings, or the views that they express in class or elsewhere.' Indeed,
there have already been a few instances (discussed in subsection D below)
in which academic freedom has been openly challenged in Hong Kong.
B. Legal Provisions Purporting to Protect Academic Freedom
Given the tensions noted above, it is important to assess what legal
protection exists for academic freedom in Hong Kong. I focus here on the
11. The incident was front page news in Hong Kong. Xu's statement was particularly controversial in that
he chose to make it when he was in Beijing for a meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference. Many Hong Kong people interpreted this as an improper invitation by Xu for Beijing to
interfere in Hong Kong affairs. Anson Chan (the second-highest official in the Hong Kong
government, who was acting Chief Executive at the time as Tung Chee-hwa was also in Beijing)
immediately condemned Xu's statement. Tung was more equivocal at first, but did eventually state
(upon his return to Hong Kong) that RTHK would continue to enjoy editorial independence. See Chris
Yeung and No Kwai-Yan, Tung: RTHK Independent and a Matter for HK People, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 7, 1998, at 1; Value of Independence, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 6, 1998, at 22
(editorial); No Kwai-Yan, Who's Your Real Boss, Critic Xu Asks RTHK, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 7, 1998, at 6. Tung's statement has not entirely reassured those who fear that pressure from China
will eventually lead to increased restrictions on RTHK.
12. See Danny Gittings, RTHK Free, For The Moment, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 8, 1998, at 12.
13. For example, democrat Dr. John Tse Wing-ling (who teaches at City University) recently called for
government guidelines to ensure that politicians who work at universities in Hong Kong are not
penalized for their views. Miranda 1p, Academics Defend Their Political Role, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 9, 1997, at 25.
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Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, as they both have specific provisions
relating to education and academic autonomy in Hong Kong. However, the
Bill of Rights Ordinance and relevant international human rights conventions
are also briefly considered.
The Basic Law is now the highest law in Hong Kong and any locally
enacted law that contradicts it should be held invalid by the courts. The
enforceability of the Joint Declaration is less certain. Now that China has
regained Hong Kong, the Chinese government may argue that Hong Kong
is an internal matter, rather than a subject of international law. However,
the Joint Declaration is a binding treaty and the international community
should continue to monitor China's compliance with it and other relevant
rules of international law."4
In assessing the extent to which the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration
protect academic freedom in Hong Kong, it is useful to consider three
possible relationships in which "academic autonomy" might be asserted: (1)
the autonomy of the Hong Kong government to operate its own educational
system and set policies that differ from those of the central government; (2)
the autonomy of academic institutions (from the Hong Kong and central
governments); and (3) the autonomy of individual academics (in teaching,
research, participating in local politics, and expressing dissent on campus).
With respect to the first relationship identified above (between the central
and Hong Kong governments), both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law
provide very detailed language. For example, Annex I to the Joint
Declaration states at Article 10:
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the
educational system previously practised in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region government shall on its own decide policies
in the fields of culture, education, science and technology, including
policies regarding the educational system and its administration, the
language of instruction, the allocation of funds, the examination system, the
system of academic awards and the recognition of educational and
technological qualifications.
14. See generally RODA MUSHKAT, ONE CouNTRY Two INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITIES: THE CASE
OF HONG KONG (1997). See also Roda Mushkat, Comment, Scrapping Hong Kong Legislation: An
International Law Perspective, 27 H.K. L.J. 12 (1997), where she argues that the decision by the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress to repeal or amend certain Hong Kong
legislation (including the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance) must be evaluated in terms of whether
it is consistent with China's obligations under the Joint Declaration and the rules of international law
(and not just in terms of its compliance with the Basic Law).
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This language makes it very clear that Hong Kong is entitled to operate
a separate education system and to embrace different educational policies
from those of the central government. The Basic Law essentially repeats this
promise. "
The legal provisions relating to the second relationship (between the
government and educational institutions) are also reasonably detailed. Annex
I, Article 10 of the Joint Declaration goes on to provide that:
Institutions of all kinds, including those run by religious and community
organisations, may retain their autonomy. They may continue to recruit
staff and use teaching materials from outside the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
The Basic Law contains similar language, and indeed is arguably
stronger than the corresponding provision of the Joint Declaration (a rare
phenomena) in that it expressly mentions academic freedom. Article 137
provides:
Educational institutions of all kinds may retain their autonomy and enjoy
academic freedom. They may continue to recruit staff and use teaching
materials from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Schools run by religious organizations may continue to provide religious
education, including courses in religion.
However, given that so many university leaders appear to have adopted
"pro-China" positions, the key issue is not so much institutional autonomy,
but rather the autonomy of individual academics. This issue is particularly
important because academics in Hong Kong have already reported that policy
making in their universities is becoming increasingly "centralized," with
little opportunity for the general faculty to influence academic policies at the
institutional level.16 It is also noteworthy that Hong Kong university teachers
apparently perceive academic freedom to be less highly valued in their own
institutions than in Hong Kong generally. In 1993, less than half of
university teachers surveyed felt that the administrations in their institutions
15. Article 136 of the BASIC LAW, supra note 2, states:
On the basis of the previous educational system, the Government of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate policies on the
development and improvement of education, including policies regarding the
educational system and its administration, the language of instruction, the allocation
of funds, the examination system, the system of academic awards, and the recognition
of educational qualifications.
16. Postiglione, supra note 8, at 254-55.
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supported academic freedom.'7 Given the political role played by university
leaders since 1993, that percentage is probably even lower today.
Thus, we cannot assume that the leaders of Hong Kong's universities will
use the autonomy given to them under the Basic Law to protect academic
freedom. There is a danger that they will publicly embrace academic
freedom, while actually adopting policies that tend to inhibit it (as a means
to avoid confrontation with the new regime). As Law Wing-Wah
commented, the top-level administrators and academics who were co-opted
by China "were, at least on the surface, willing to abide by the rules of the
game prescribed by the PRC Government. If they continue to do so...
resistance by higher education from the top against the new SAR
Government would likely be reduced." 8
Thus, the legal provisions of greatest concern are those that apply to
individual academic freedom. Unfortunately, these provisions are
significantly less detailed than those relating to institutional autonomy. The
education sections of the Joint Declaration and Basic Law actually contain
no reference to the freedom of individual academics.. However, in a section
on general rights, the Joint Declaration does list "academic research" as one
of the "rights and freedoms" that will be "protected by law." 9 Similarly,
the Basic Law (in the chapter on fundamental rights and duties of residents),
states that "Hong Kong residents shall have freedom to engage in academic
research, literary and artistic creation, and other cultural activities."20
It is not clear why individual academic freedom is mentioned here rather
than in the sections devoted to education. What is noteworthy is that these
brief references mention only academic research. Neither the Joint
Declaration nor the Basic Law makes any reference to the autonomy of
individual academics with respect to teaching or political activities. In those
areas, academics would have to rely on the legal provisions of the Joint
Declaration and Basic Law that apply to the community generally (rather
than just to academia), such as those protecting free expression and
opinion.2
17. Id. at 25658, 262.
18. Law Wing-Wah, supra note 10, at 55.
19. Joint Declaration, supra note I, 3(5) and Annex 1, art. X11I.
20. BAsIc LAW, supra note 2, art. 34.
21. See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, 3(5) and Annex 1, art. XII; and BASIc LAW, supra note 2, art.
2739.
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The Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance22 (which is based upon the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR)) does not
expressly mention academic freedom. But it does contain many relevant
provisions, such as those protecting freedom of opinion, expression,
assembly and association, and the right to participate in public life.23 The
Bill of Rights binds only the government, public authorities, and their
agents." Fortunately, however, universities have been held to be "public
authorities" for this purpose. The Bill of Rights Ordinance is an ordinary
law and is not superior to laws enacted subsequent to it. However, the Basic
Law (which is superior law) expressly provides that the ICCPR (on which
Hong Kong's Bill of Rights is based) shall remain in force and be
implemented through the laws of Hong Kong.26 Thus, an academic should
be able to use the Basic Law to challenge any laws that are inconsistent with
the ICCPR and the Bill of Rights.
Moreover, academics could also seek to rely upon the international
human rights conventions as such. Both the ICCPR and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the ICESCR) continue
to apply to Hong Kong (by virtue of express provisions in the Joint
Declaration27 and the Basic LaWi' ). In recent years, non-governmental
22. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG, ch. 383 (1991). The Bill of Rights
Ordinance was proposed in late 1989 (as part of the Hong Kong government's efforts to rebuild public
confidence after the Beijing massacre in June, 1989) and enacted in 1991. Beijing opposed its
enactment and originally threatened to repeal the entire ordinance in 1997. Instead it deleted only
sections 2(3), 3, and 4, which relate to its interpretation and application to legislation. See Decision
of the Standing Committee of the National People 's Congress on the Treatment of the Laws Previously
in Force in Hong Kong in Accordance with Article 160 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the Standing Committee on Feb.
23, 1997 (an English translation of which appears at 27 H.K. L.J. 419 (1997)). It has been argued that
these deletions should have no effect on the application of the Bill of Rights, as they simply stated
common law rules that should be applied by a court in any event. See, e.g., Yash Ghai, The Continuity
of Laws and Legal Rights and Obligations in the SAR, 27 H.K. L.J. 136, 14243 (1997). However, if
Hong Kong judges become less independent, it is certainly possible that they "may be tempted to rely
on the repeal to argue for a narrow and less purposive interpretation of the Bill of Rights." Id.
23. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG, ch. 383, art. 1518, 2 1, § 8.
24. Id. ch. 383, § 7. For further discussion of § 7 and its implications, see Andrew Byrnes, The Hong
Kong Bill of Rights and Relations Between Private Individuals, in THE HONG KONG BILL OF RIGHTS:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH (Johannes Chan & Yash Ghai eds., 1993).
25. Hong Kong Polytechnic Univ. v. Next Magazine Ltd., [199616 H.K.P.L.R. 117, 12324 (High Court).
26. BASIC LAW, supra note 2, art. 39, provides that the provisions of the ICCPR and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights "shall remain in force and shall be implemented
through the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region."
27. The provisions of the ICCPR and the ICESCR "as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force." Joint
Declaration, supra note I, Annex I, art. XIII.
28. See BASIC LAW, supra note 2, art. 39.
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organizations in Hong Kong have regularly made submissions to the Human
Rights Committee. These submissions have supplemented the information
provided by the Hong Kong government (via the British government) and
can be relied upon by the Committee in its assessment of the extent to which
Hong Kong is complying with international human rights law.
C. Enforcing Laws Protecting Academic Freedom
As demonstrated above, a restriction on academic freedom (whether by
the government or by an institution) could be challenged in court. In the
event of a blatant violation of academic freedom (such as an express policy
prohibiting certain statements in research or teaching), I am reasonably
confident that the Hong Kong courts would enforce the relevant legal
provisions. However, no one actually expects such an open attack. The
official position of Hong Kong's universities and the Hong Kong government
will certainly continue to be one of supporting academic freedom.
My concern lies with the less obvious restrictions, for example, the fear
that an academic will be disadvantaged, perhaps even dismissed, if she
regularly writes articles critical of the local or Chinese governments.
Universities may remove controversial teachers to avoid confrontation with
China. They may even receive quiet pressure from high-placed persons in
Hong Kong who (like the critics of RTHK) believe that publicly funded
institutions should not oppose the government.
Of course, non-tenured academics are particularly vulnerable to such
covert restrictions on academic freedom. A 1993 survey reported that less
than half of Hong Kong's tertiary level teachers were tenured. 29 The
percentage has probably dropped further since then, as Hong Kong's
universities have made a conscious decision to move away from tenure
(known as "substantiation" in Hong Kong) to a system of renewable
contracts. Thus, many university teachers in Hong Kong are not even given
the opportunity to apply for tenure. Clearly, this makes faculty more
vulnerable to pressure from university administrators and senior academics.
In the absence of tenure, a decision not to renew a contract is very difficult
to challenge. It is for this reason that international declarations on academic
freedom urge universities to establish a system of tenure for teachers.30
29. Postiglione, supra note 8, at 242.
30. For example, the Lima Declaration on Academic Freedom and Autonomy of Institutions of Higher
Education provides at Article 5 that "institutions of higher education shall guarantee a system of stable
and secure employment for teachers and researchers. No member of the academic community shall
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Indeed, even a case of retaliation against a tenured faculty member
would not necessarily be challenged in court in Hong Kong. It is extremely
expensive to sue in Hong Kong. Legal fees are among the highest in the
world and lawyers are not permitted to act on a contingency fee basis. 31
Moreover, because the costs rules are the opposite of those in the United
States, courts normally make orders of costs against the loser. Thus, one has
to be very confident of winning a lawsuit before taking the decision to sue
one's employer. Even if a tenured academic successfully sues his or her
institution, it is not at all clear that the court would order that the academic
be reinstated. Under Hong Kong contract law, there is a strong presumption
against ordering specific enforcement of an employment contract even if the
employee is seeking reinstatement. 32  This common law presumption has
been modified somewhat by recently enacted statutory provisions. For
example, in cases of dismissals due to gender or disability, the relevant
legislation expressly states that the court may make an order of
reinstatement." However, this is a discretionary remedy and it is
questionable whether Hong Kong courts would ever order it over the
opposition of the employer.
The famous Jill Spruce34 case (although not a case involving academic
freedom) illustrates the difficulties of obtaining an order of reinstatement
against a university in Hong Kong. Jill Spruce was a tenured senior lecturer
in the Faculty of Law of the University of Hong Kong. She also engaged in
outside practice as a barrister, despite the fact that her head of department
had expressly withdrawn his permission for her to do so. This contravened
the University's "outside practice" regulations and she was dismissed.
Spruce applied to the High Court for an order of certiorari to quash the
decision to dismiss her. Her application failed in the High Court and she
be dismissed without a fair hearing before a democratically elected body of the academic community."
Lima Declaration at art. 5, reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM 3, Annex 1 (1995).
31. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE BAR OF HONG KONG, 124 [hereinafter BAR CODE]; MICHAEL
SANDOR & MICHAEL WILKINSON, THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF LAWYERS IN HONG KONG 54445
(1996).
32. See BErrY Ho, HONG KONG CONTRACT LAW 493 (2d ed. 1994).
33. The Hong Kong government opposed the addition of the remedy of reinstatement to this legislation.
For a discussion of the enactment ofHong Kong's first anti-discrimination legislation and the provision
of the remedy of reinstatement in the Disability Discrimination Ordinance, see Carole J. Petersen,
Equality as a Human Right: the Development ofAnti-Discrimination Law in Hong Kong, 34 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 335, 38385 (1996). For a discussion of the 1997 amendment that added the remedy
of reinstatement to the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, see Carole J. Petersen, Hong Kong's First Anti-
Discrimination Laws and Their Potential Impact on the Employment Market, 27 H.K. L.J. 324, 34951
(1997).
34. Jill Spruce & the University of Hong Kong, [1991] 2 H.K.L.R. 444 (Ct. App.).
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appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the
University's decision to terminate her employment was based upon her
failure to observe its regulations on outside practice but that she was not
contractually bound by these regulations. The Court of Appeal thus held that
the dismissal was based upon an error of law and was "susceptible to an
order of quash." However, the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to
decline to make an order of certiorari quashing the decision, noting that to
issue such an order would be "tantamount to decreeing specific performance
of a contract of personal service."" Of course, if courts strictly apply the
rule against specific performance, then the entire system of academic tenure
becomes largely ineffective as a means of protecting academic freedom.36
The Spruce case also illustrates the danger of Hong Kong's costs rules.
Although the Court of Appeal declined to quash the decision to dismiss
Spruce, it ordered the University of Hong Kong to pay her legal costs, both
for the appeal and for her original action in the High Court (presumably
because it decided that the decision to dismiss her proceeded upon an error
of law). However, Spruce then appealed the denial of her motion for an
order to quash to the Privy Council (at that time the final court of appeal for
Hong Kong). The University cross appealed against the order that it pay
Spruce's legal costs. The Privy Council reversed the Hong Kong Court of
Appeal, holding that the outside practice rules had been incorporated into the
contract and that therefore the University had not made an error of law in
deciding to terminate Spruce's employment. 37  The Privy Council then
ordered Spruce, as the loser in the action, to pay the University's costs
(before the High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Privy Council). 38 It
35. Id at 452. It should be noted that Spruce had been accused of a good deal more than just engaging in
outside practice without permission, including canceling classes without sufficient notice and lying
about the reason for canceling. However the Court of Appeal held that the decision to terminate her
was susceptible to an order to quash because "[w]e cannot accept that the [University] Council would
assuredly have resolved as it did had the soundness of [Spruce's] contention as to the terms of her
contract been appreciated." Id.
36. This argument was made in an article that appeared after the Court of Appeal's decision. See W. S.
Clarke, Academic Tenure and the Protection of Academic Freedom, 21 H.K. L. J. 374, 376 (1991).
Clarke notes that Spruce did not claim that her academic freedom was infringed and that "sadly, the
concept appears not to have been put before the court as relevant to its exercise of discretion." Id. It
is possible, that in a case in which the dismissed academic alleged infringement of academic freedom,
the court might be more willing to exercise its discretion to order reinstatement.
37. Jill Spruce & The University ofHong Kong, [1993] 2 H.K.L.R. 65, 71 (Privy Council).
38. Id. at 72.
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was reported that Spruce owed the University more than HK $3 million and
that she disappeared from Hong Kong, abandoning her law practice.39
Although the Spruce case was not about academic freedom, it was very
big news in Hong Kong's academic and legal communities. In the minds of
Hong Kong academics, the case stands for two principles: (1) the remedy of
reinstatement is unlikely to be ordered; and (2) the financial risks of taking
legal action far outweigh the potential benefits. The case makes it highly
unlikely that even a tenured academic would take legal action against a
university in Hong Kong.
This means that the primary restriction on university administrators who
might wish to restrict academic freedom will be the fear of bad publicity that
it would generate (both in Hong Kong and internationally). To that extent,
it is useful to examine some of the recent cases in which academic freedom
has allegedly been challenged and the reaction to these cases in the local and
international press.
D. Examples of Specific Challenges to Academic Freedom
1. The City University Incidents
In the two years leading up to the resumption of Chinese sovereignty,
Faculty of Law at the City University of Hong Kong has endured an
unusually vicious internal dispute (even for academics). In the end, the
leader of one faction (Professor Wang Guiguo, the faculty's first dean from
mainland China) was forced to give up the deanship and a prominent
member of the other faction (Professor Derek Roebuck, the faculty's first
dean) was actually firedA
"Academic freedom," as such, was probably not the main cause of the
turmoil in the Faculty of Law. The dispute concerned broader questions,
including the direction of the Faculty of Law, its leadership, and the degree
of control exercised by the dean. However, the dispute certainly raised
issues that are relevant to academic freedom. For example, it demonstrated
39. See Ron Gluckman, Battle for Disputed Funds Proves Futile, S. CI NA MORNING POST, June 5, 1994,
at 5; and Greg Torode, Bid to Halt Bankruptcy Proceedings, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 25, 1994,
at3.
40. See Alison Smith, Row Sparks Upheaval on Legal Campus, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 15, 1997,
at 1. Initially Roebuck was simply notified that his contract would not be renewed. However, City
University later decided to terminate him before the end of his contract, exercising its right to pay him
three months pay in lieu ofnotice, so as to dismiss him "without cause assigned." See Derek Roebuck,
Why Did They Sack Me?, SUNDAY MORNING POST, Apr. 20, 1997, at 9.
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the vulnerability of academic staff who are employed on contract terms and
the extent to which one or a few persons (such as the dean and head of
department) can influence the contract renewal decision. It is understood
that one of the complaints made by staff was that Professor Guiguo saw to
it that the contracts of certain academic staff (both Chinese and expatriate)
were not renewed reportedly because they had either fallen out of favor with
him or had challenged him on particular issues.
The dispute at City University also raises the question of the extent to
which a university should be allowed to censor damaging news about itself.
There were frequent news stories about the dispute in the Faculty of Law,
which damaged its reputation in the community and the legal profession.
For example, Professor Roebuck publicized his claim that members of the
Faculty of Law were being pressured to lower standards to accommodate
students with inadequate English language skills. He claimed that he was
asked to raise the marks of several students who had failed his contracts
course and that when he refused, the course was taken out of his control and
the students reassessed at a lower standard." Needless to say, this report
caught the attention of the Law Society and may damage the employment
opportunities of City University graduates. The bad publicity reportedly
enraged the President of City University. Indeed, it is widely believed that
the reason that Roebuck was ultimately fired was not so much the particular
positions he took in City University itself, but rather the fact that he
publicized the dispute.42 It has also been reported that City University tried
to prevent bad publicity by actually barring reporters from conducting
interviews on campus without prior approval.43
One can certainly appreciate the frustration of university administrators
when embarrassing disputes are aired in the press, particularly ones which
call into question the quality of graduates. Yet given: (1) the centralized
nature of Hong Kong's universities; (2) the trend away from tenure; and (3)
the difficulty of taking legal action against one's university, press attention
may be the strongest protection available to an academic who feels under
threat. If an academic who believes that his or her autonomy (whether in the
classroom or in research) is being restricted cannot make complaints in the
press, then it will be extremely difficult for that academic to fight back.
41. Hedley Thomas, A Law unto Themselves, SUNDAY MORNING POST, Feb. 9, 1997, Agenda see., at 1.
42. The University's reply to Roebuck, which was published alongside his article Why Did TheySack Me?,
supra note 40, implies that he was terminated because of his decision to publicize his complaints.
43. May Sin-Mi Hon, Academic Freedom Row over Clamp, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 5, 1997, at
3.
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Indeed, the importance of press attention was very clearly demonstrated
in another incident involving City University. In July 1997 (a few weeks
after the handover), City University re-issued regulations on outside practice
to department heads reminding the staff of their obligations. The regulations
required staff to seek approval before engaging in any form of outside
practice. In and of itself, this was not remarkable. However, the definition
of "outside practice" was extremely broad. The regulations classified
outside practice into three categories: consultancies, commercial work, and
general educational work. General educational work was defined to include:
"occasional broadcast talks or interviews, preparation of manuscripts for
books or journals, book reviews, [and] casual journalism.""
Members of the Faculty of Law pointed out to the administration the
inherent dangers in these regulations as early as 1995. Yet no effort was
made to amend the regulations, leaving staff in a very vulnerable position.
However, when the same regulations were reissued in July of 1997, the story
was leaked to the press (no doubt by an unhappy member of the staff). City
University was strongly criticized in local newspapers45 and quickly
announced that it would "tidy up" its regulations so as to make it clear that
approval would be required only for paid work.
The President of City University held a press conference to dispel
rumors that City University had been attempting to curb academic freedom.
He insisted that "[wle do not want to monitor what type of work they do or
what they say. It's not the nature of the work, but the remuneration and time
they spend that concerns the university., 46 However, given the fact that
teachers had previously complained about the regulations, it is hard to
believe that the broad scope of the regulations was merely a "mistake." It
would appear that had it not been for the press coverage (and the fact that the
story followed many other damaging stories about City University) the
regulations might not have been amended.
2. Patriotism in Education-the David Chu Incidents
David Chu, a member of the controversial Provisional Legislative
Council is known for his optimistic views of Hong Kong's return to China.
44. May Sin-Mi Hon, Academic Freedom Row over Clamp, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 5, 1997, at
3.
45. See Carmen Cheung, City University Told to Explain Clamp on its Academics, HONG KONG
STANDARD, Aug. 9, 1997; S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 5, 1997, at 18 (editorial).
46. May Sin-Mi Hon, University to Tidy Rules for Outside Work, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 7,1997,
at 4.
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He has also publicly urged that "patriotic education" should be strengthened
in Hong Kong. In the summer of 1997, Richard Baum, a Visiting Professor
of International Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, wrote a
letter to the editor of the South China Morning Post suggesting that Chu's
proposal for increased patriotism in education was "ill-considered. 47"
Shortly after the letter was published, Chu wrote to Baum's departmental
chairman at Chinese University complaining that Baum's "colonial
arrogance" rendered him unfit to teach in Hong Kong.
This was not the only time that Chu had complained about a university
teacher. He also wrote to Baptist University about statements made by Tim
Hamlett, a lecturer in Baptist University's Department of Journalism.
Hamlett had upset Chu when he took issue (in his column in the Sunday
Morning Post) with a statement by Chu that Hong Kong people had been
"overwhelmed" by the reunification celebrations. Hamlett argued that most
people did not actually celebrate Hong Kong's return to China. Chu sent a
fax to Hamlet, which Hamlett later described as "quite abusive" and "the
rudest letter I have ever seen." More importantly, Chu sent copies of the fax
to Hamlett's department head and the Vice-chancellor of Baptist University.
Fortunately, both institutions responded by issuing statements supporting
academic freedom in general and specifically supporting the rights of
academics to express opinions different from those of the local
establishment.48 Several articles criticising Chu were published in Hong
Kong49 and the South China Morning Post endorsed a suggestion (made by
Professor Raymond Wacks of the University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law)
for a special group monitoring academic freedom.5' Chu was also criticized
abroad, where the articles not only presented his actions as clear cases of
infringement of academic freedom, but also implied that they were part of
a general decline in freedom in Hong Kong. For example, the incident was
described in one story in the international press as "the latest in a clash over
individual freedoms in Hong Kong, five weeks after it returned to Chinese
rule." 5'
47. Letter from Professor Richard Baum, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 4, 1997, at 18.
48. Shirley Kwok, Colleges Defend Right to Criticise, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 5, 1997, at 3.
49. See Gren Manuel, Legislator Tried to Get Me Sacked: Don, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 4, 1997,
at 1; Fanny Wong, Debate Helps to Stimulate Learning, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 6, 1997, at
16.
50. Open Debate, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 5, 1997, at 18 (editorial).
51. See Graham Hutchings, Academics Take on Hong Kong Leader, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 6,
1997, at 12. The story was also published in Canada. See Hong Kong Legislator Triggers Row over
Academic Freedom, VANCOUVER SUN, Aug. 6, 1997, at A12.
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Initially Chu argued that his letters were not intended to intimidate the
two academics but rather were just part of an open debate (although he
declined to release his actual letters). Chu also denied that he was trying to
put pressure on the universities and refused to acknowledge the significance
of a legislator (particularly one that had been appointed by China) sending
such letters to the academics' supervisors. The negative response in the
press apparently caused him to rethink his position, as he did eventually
publicly apologize to both the academics. However, Chu's apology mainly
focused on the tone of his attack, stating that "at times I was very rude to
them." He made it clear that he was not backing down from his call for
increased patriotism in Hong Kong's educational system.52
3. Political Correctness and Taiwan
The one thing that seems guaranteed to generate controversy and upset
China is any statement that appears inconsistent with its "one China" policy.
China's attitude toward this issue (and people's reaction to it) is a little bit
like the story of the emperor's new clothes. It is obvious to everyone that
Taiwanfinctions as a separate country with a separate government, separate
military, and separate international relations (albeit often in unofficial terms).
Yet if one wants to get along with China, one is expected to pretend that this
is not so.
China's sensitivity over this issue was clearly demonstrated in June 1996,
during the well-publicized interview of Lu Ping (China's main spokesperson
on Hong Kong at the time) on Cable News Network (CNN). Lu Ping stated
that despite the guarantee of free expression in the Hong Kong Basic Law,
no one in Hong Kong would be permitted to advocate independence for
Taiwan after July 1, 1997. Lu Ping attempted to draw an analogy to Hawaii,
claiming that the United States would not allow the press to advocate its
independence either. Needless to say, this was front page news in Hong
Kong.53 The story generated a great deal of bad press for China in Hong
Kong (including some angry letters from Americans, eager to correct Lu
Ping's understanding of American law). Later statements implied that Lu
Ping had made a mistake in using the term "advocate," rather than "incite."
But the issue is still very much alive in Hong Kong, as demonstrated by the
ban on Taiwan flags during the "double ten" anniversary celebrations in
52. David Chu, A Sorry Case for Patriotism in Schools, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 7, 1997, at 18.
See also Still Punching on the Way Down, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 10, 1997, at 10.
53. See Chris Yeung, Lu Sets out Ground Rules for Press Freedom after 1997, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
June 1, 1996, at 1.
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October 1997. Police officers removed Taiwanese flags from footbridges
and the roadside, and the government may introduce legislation to expressly
restrict the celebrations in 1998. 4
How then will academics handle the "Taiwan question"? One recent
incident demonstrates the potential for conflict even in very mild academic
statements. The South China Morning Post recently reported that the
President of the University of Science and Technology sent an "email"
message to academics, criticizing the title of a seminar they had organized
on Taiwan." The title was "Taiwan's political reform and its relationship to
mainland China." The President told the staff that they should instead use
the term "Chinese mainland."56 He explained, "It is important one gets used
to using the right terminology since otherwise one would imply there is more
than one China."57
The Acting Head of the Social Sciences Department confirmed that she
had received this message, but said that it arrived too late to amend the title.
The article did not report whether she would have amended the title had time
permitted. She refused to comment on whether the President was trying to
influence academic discussion. However, several other academics were
quick to criticize the President's action, complaining that it was an attempt
to "intervene in freedom of expression." The President of the Professional
Teachers' Union was quoted as stating that "universities should be a place
to cultivate academic freedom. I don't see any reason why any words or
topics should be banned." The President of the University (who, the
newspaper took pains to point out, had been a "Beijing appointed Hong
Kong advisor and a member of the Preparatory Committee") insisted that he
had no intention of harming freedom of expression. In his opinion, "he was
only pointing out a mistake ... and reminding staff that 'Chinese mainland'
was the correct term."5
8
If the mild and rather ambiguous phrase "mainland China" (which is
used all the time in conversation in Hong Kong) can arouse that much
concern, one must ask how the President would have reacted if the title of
the seminar had been: "Why Taiwan is and should remain independent of
Mainland China." It appears that this issue may eventually present some
54. Baby Sung & Carmen Cheung, Pro-Taiwan Groups Get Legal Warning, HONG KONG STANDARD, Oct.
7, 1997.
55. Shirley Kwok, 'Mainland China' Term Gives Rise to Academic Angst, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept.
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important tests of the extent to which academic freedom is protected in Hong
Kong.59
4. Student Movements and Freedom of Expression on Campus
Although the main focus of my discussion of academic freedom is the
freedom of university teachers, the question of students' freedom on campus
also deserves some comment. 6° Hong Kong students have not engaged in
extensive political activism during the transition period (with the notable
exception of the Tiananmen Square protests, which mobilized Hong Kong
people generally). However, there have been some clashes between students
and university administrations.
For example, students criticised their universities' vice-chancellors and
presidents for agreeing to serve as Hong Kong Affairs Advisors and
members of the Preparatory Committee while at the same time refusing to
convey the opinions of students and staff. Students asked their vice-
chancellors to express their opposition to the establishment of the Provisional
Legislature. However, the vice-chancellors have refused to do so. Lah
Wing-Wah has described these confrontations as follows:
The core issue of these conflicts on campus was a dilemma created in the
co-option process. The vice-chancellors were selected because of their key
positions in universities. Were it not for these positions, they might not
have been chosen by the PRC Government. This was an argument used by
Hong Kong students to request their university heads to represent their
interests. However, the selected university heads were appointed in a
personal capacity. This allowed them to express opinions, make decisions
and vote without consultation with their university councils, teachers, or
students. 6
59. Similar issues may develop with respect to China's treatment of Tibet. It has been reported that some
university publishers have practiced self-censorship by refusing to publish books concerning political
issues related to Tibet. See Enoch Wong, Local College Head Tells of Staff Self-Censorship, HONG
KONG STANDARD, Nov. 6, 1996 (quoting Frank Ching of the Far Eastern Economic Review). The
same article quotes the President of Lingnan College as stating that he was aware of self-censorship
by academics. To his credit, the President stated that the heads of Hong Kong's institutions should
"guide our staff to maintain ... academic freedom." Id.
60. Neither the Joint Declaration nor the Basic Law expressly address the issue of student dissent on
campus (although they do provide for freedom of choice in education). However, students can rely on
the general provisions discussed above relating to freedom of expression, assembly, and political
activity. Students engaged in research could rely on the provisions discussed relating to freedom of
research, as those provisions are not limited to teachers.
61. Law Wing-Wah, supra note 10, at 58.
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Other conflicts have arisen when students have expressed their own
opposition to China on campus. For example, in 1996 the University of
Hong Kong removed students' slogans condemning the Tiananmen Square
massacre. The administration claimed that the slogans had been placed on
the pavement without permission and that while it had shown leniency for
seven years, the time had come to remove them. The students complained,
repainted the slogans, and have insisted on conducting their own poll of the
University community on the issue.62 The issue has generated a good deal
of press coverage, which appears to have caused the Vice-Chancellor to back
down somewhat from his initial insistence thai the slogans simply had to go
and that prior consultation was not required.63
University of Hong Kong students also insisted on bringing onto campus
the controversial "Pillar of Shame" sculpture (honoring those killed in
Beijing in June 1989). The Vice-Chancellor initially refused permission.
But when the truck hired by students arrived at the campus gates late one
night (accompanied by television crews) he ultimately backed down and
agreed to let them display it. Indeed, he wisely took the opportunity to
reassure students (on camera) that the University would continue to be a
place of free speech and academic freedom. Other universities in Hong
Kong have also agreed to allow either the sculpture or other emblems (such
as paintings of the "Goddess of Democracy") on campus. Once again, the
importance of press attention was clearly demonstrated. The issue was well
covered in the press and the universities did not want to be saddled with a
reputation for restricting free expression.
III. THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A. The Structure and Independence of the Profession
The importance of maintaining an independent legal profession is widely
recognized in Hong Kong. Even the Chinese government probably realizes
that the legal profession is essential to Hong Kong's continued economic
62. Letter from Hong Kong University Students' Union to all Academic and Non-Academic Staff (Oct.
10, 1997) (on file with the author).
63. See Enoch Wong, Cheung Says June 4 Slogans Must Go, HONG KONG STANDARD, Oct. 17, 1996;
Rodger Lee, Democracy Slogans to Stay as University Holds Survey, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov.
26, 1996, at 4; Enoch Wong, Students Def Campus Ban on Slogans, HONG KONG STANDARD, June
4, 1997; Wanda Szeto, Students Repaint June 4 Slogans, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 18, 1997,
at 4.
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success. Companies will be less willing to invest in and trade with Hong
Kong if they cannot rely upon the impartiality of the legal system, which
requires both an independent judiciary and a strong legal profession.
Hong Kong still has a divided legal profession, with separate professional
bodies for solicitors (the Law Society) and barristers (the Bar Association). 64
The main statute governing the profession is the Legal Practitioners
Ordinance. It vests the Law Society and Bar Association with significant
autonomy and powers, and thus the legal profession is largely self-
regulating.
The Basic Law expressly protects the right to legal representation.
Article 35 states that "Hong Kong residents shall have the right to
confidential legal advice, access to the courts, choice of lawyers for timely
protection of their lawful rights and interests or for representation in the
courts . . ."65 Article 94 provides that it will be the responsibility of the
Hong Kong government (rather than the national government) "[o]n the basis
of the system previously operating in Hong Kong ... [to] make provisions
for local lawyers and lawyers from outside Hong Kong to work and practice
in the region." 66  The Basic Law does not specifically recognize the right
of the legal profession to self-regulate. However, Article 142 does provide
for the continued recognition and autonomy of professional bodies
generally.' Moreover, the reference in Article 94 to "the system previously
operating in Hong Kong" strongly implies that the legal profession should
continue to exercise considerable autonomy.68
Most lawyers in Hong Kong are solicitors69 and the bulk of legal work
is done by them. Solicitors may appear in the lower courts (magistrates
courts and the District Court), and also in the Court of First Instance
(formerly the High Court) on the hearing of appeals from magistrates courts.
Only barristers have a general right of audience in the Court of First Instance
and in the Court of Appeal. Barristers are specialists in advocacy. They
64. Law students in Hong Kong pursue the same academic training. This is generally a three-year L.L.B.
plus a one-year Postgraduate Certificate in Laws (the PCLL). Upon completion of the PCLL, a
graduate must choose whether to become a solicitor (in which case he or she must complete two years
of trainee solicitorship) or a barrister (in which case he or she must complete one year of pupillage).
It is possible to switch to the other side of the profession, but one cannot practice as both a solicitor and
a barrister at the same time.
65. BASIc LAW, supra note 2, art. 35.
66. BASIC LAW, supra note 2, art. 94.
67. BAsIC LAW, supra note 2, art. 142.
68. BASIC LAW, supra note 2, art. 94.
69. Recent reports indicate that there are about 3500 practicing solicitors in Hong Kong, as compared to
only about 600 practicing barristers. See SANDOR & WILKINSON, supra note 3 1, at 3.
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have a right of audience in all courts, give written opinions on questions of
law, and prepare certain documents relating to litigation.
The Law Society of Hong Kong has long argued that solicitors should be
given greater rights of audience in the higher courts. The Bar Association
views any such proposal as a step towards fusion of the profession, which it
strongly opposes. It is arguable that abolishing the Bar's monopoly in the
higher courts would make it more difficult for young barristers to obtain
work and discourage the best graduates from becoming barristers. Over
time, this could weaken the Bar and decrease the public's access to a pool of
specialists in litigation who are not tied to a particular firm.
The Bar is correct in arguing that it can be very difficult for a young
barrister to earn a living. Barristers are required (by the Bar Code) to work
as solo practitioners. They may not form partnerships or work in a firm
(although they may share the expenses of maintaining an office, known as
"chambers").7" The primary justification for this rule is that the formation
of partnerships would reduce the choice of barristers, as those in the same
partnership could not represent conflicting interests. This argument is
particularly compelling in the context of Hong Kong, as there are only about
600 practicing barristers, less than 50 of whom are Senior Counsel. 7
Another important ethical rule is that a barrister cannot be approached
directly by a client, but must be retained by the client's solicitor. This rule
is purportedly justified by the need for barristers to maintain their
impartiality and independence.72 However, it has been criticized as
inefficient and unduly expensive and certain exceptions are now recognized.
For example, representatives of certain professional bodies (such as the
Hong Kong Society of Accountants) now have direct access to barristers.73
B. The Status of Foreign Lawyers and Law Firms in Hong Kong
The regulation of foreign lawyers in Hong Kong has been an extremely
controversial issue in the past decade. As recently as 1992, Hong Kong was
70. BAR CODE, supra note 31, 28, 81-83.
71. Barristers are graded into senior barristers and junior barristers. Prior to July 1, 1997, senior barristers
were known as "Queen's Counsel." They are now referred to as "Senior Counsel."
72. See Consultation Paper on Legal Services in 1995 Al-Y GEN'S CHAMBERS, HONG KONG
GOVERNMENT 2.35. It has also been argued that the rule makes it easier for barristers to specialize
in advocacy, in that they do not have to devote large amounts of time to meeting with the lay client.
Id. 2.34.
73. See BAR CODE, supra note 31, Annex 19 (Direct Professional Access Rules and Recommended
Standard Terms of Engagement).
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described as "one of the most restrictive jurisdictions" with respect to the
licensing of foreign law firms and the qualification of foreign lawyers to
practice in Hong Kong. 74 Foreign law firms were permitted to open offices
in Hong Kong (beginning in 1972), but were subject to strict limitations.
There was also no examination or other procedures by which a foreign
lawyer could be admitted to practice as a Hong Kong lawyer.
Lawyers from commonwealth and European Community jurisdictions
were fortunate in that the United Kingdom provided a "back door" through
which they could be admitted in Hong Kong. They could take the English
Qualified Lawyers Transfer test, become admitted as a solicitor in the United
Kingdom, and then be admitted in Hong Kong without any additional
training or examination. However, American lawyers were not eligible to
take the English Qualified Lawyers Transfer Test. Thus American firms
with offices in Hong Kong petitioned for: (1) the right to employ Hong Kong
solicitors in their firms; and (2) an examination by which they could
themselves qualify as Hong Kong lawyers.
For many years, the Law Society of Hong Kong strongly opposed such
petitions.75 The fear of competition from the American firms was probably
the most significant consideration in the debate. However, the issue of the
status of PRC lawyers after 1997 was also raised. Some representatives of
the Law Society argued that the rules could not be relaxed for American
lawyers without also relaxing them for PRC lawyers. It was even claimed
that this would give PRC lawyers a "legitimate means of seizing control of
our legal system. 76
Eventually, however, the Law Society softened its position and a new
regulatory scheme was developed. The most notable reform is that foreign
lawyers can now gain admission by passing a specified examination. The
new scheme brings the law relating to the admission of solicitors into line
with Hong Kong's obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services ("GATS"). 7 7 In contrast, the criteria for admission as a barrister
has not yet been liberalized and there is no examination by which a foreign
lawyer can gain admission as a Hong Kong barrister. However, it is
recognized that the current law is inconsistent with GATS and the Hong
74. Alison E. W. Conner, Regulation of Foreign Lawyers in Hong Kong, 22 HONG KONG LAWYER 132
(1992).
75. Id. at 133.
76. S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 13,1991 (quoting Simon lp). Conner cites this and other "scare stories"
on the subject in her article, supra note 73, at 145.
77. For a summary of the new regulatory scheme, see Emme Waller, Entry to the Legal Profession and
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GA TS), in LAW LECTURES FOR PRACrMONERS 1995
145-46 (Janet Burton ed., 1995)
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Kong Bar Association is expected to propose appropriate amendments in the
near future.78
C. The Legal Profession's Role in the Transition Period
Like academia, the Hong Kong legal profession has been very involved
in the transition to Chinese sovereignty. Both the Law Society and the Bar
Association have drafted numerous submissions on legal and political
developments, including the debates over the enactment of the Bill of Rights
Ordinance (in 1991) and the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (in 1995).
While both professional bodies have stood up for the rule of law and human
rights, the Bar Association appears to be more willing to take (and stick to)
positions that China opposes. This may be attributable to the fact that
solicitor firms are increasingly serving clients doing business in China -and
therefore cannot risk being too antagonistic towards the Chinese government.
In addition to lobbying, the legal profession has had some direct input
into lawmaking in Hong Kong. Since the introduction of "functional
constituencies," the legal profession has enjoyed representation in the
Legislative Council. Barrister Martin Lee got his start in Hong Kong politics
as the first representative elected from the legal profession. 9 He was
followed by solicitor Simon Ip. When Ip announced that he would not stand
for re-election in 1995, former Law Society President Donald Yap
announced that he would run for the seat' and it was widely assumed that he
would win. However, Yap received some criticism for appearing too willing
to agree with China on transitional issues. Yap had been appointed by China
as a Hong Kong Affairs Advisor and he stated (in answer to a question at a
forum at City University) that he would be willing to sit on a provisional
legislature when China dissolved the elected legislature (as it had already
pledged to do, in response to the democracy reforms successfully proposed
by Governor Patten).
In contrast, one of Yap's opponents, barrister Margaret Ng (a more
outspoken supporter of human rights and democracy, who has never shown
any fear of criticizing China) stated that she would flatly refuse to sit on any
78. Id. at 147.
79. Lee gave up representing the legal functional constituency to run, successfully, in the first direct
elections' to the Legislative Council in 1991. He was re-elected in 1995 but lost his seat in 1997 when
the elected legislature was dissolved by China. However, he is still a leader in the Democratic Party
and will almost certainly win a seat in the 1998 elections.
80. See Yap to Stand at Forthcoming Elections, HONG KONG LAWYER, July 1995, at 7.
81. Lok Wong, Lawyers Draw Battle Lines, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 25, 1995, at 6.
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such body. Ng unexpectedly won the seat (and by a significant margin).82
Since solicitors far outnumber barristers in Hong Kong (by a ratio of at least
5 to 1), the majority of solicitors must have voted for Ng, rather than for
their former president. It would appear that regardless of what positions
solicitors feel they must adopt publicly, when they voted by secret ballot in
1995 they wanted a strong spokesperson in the legislature, one that would
not be too eager to compromise with China. Of course, Ng lost her seat
when China dissolved the legislature in 1997. It will be very interesting to
see who is elected to represent the legal functional constituency in the 1998
elections.
D. Representation of Controversial Clients
One quite significant event raised concerns about the willingness of
solicitors' firms to represent clients who are unpopular with the Chinese
government. In 1993, Simon Li, a former justice of the Hong Kong Court
of Appeal, was reported to have stated that Martin Lee and Szeto Wah
(leaders of Hong Kong's Democratic Party) as well as Emily Lau and
Christine Loh (also liberal legislators at the time) were unfit to serve in Hong
Kong's legislature after 1997. He also accused Martin Lee and Szeto Wah
of inciting the Hong Kong public to stage a run on the Bank of China after
the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989. Lee and Wah denied the
latter claim and prepared to institute libel proceedings in Hong Kong.
It should not have been difficult for them to find a firm of solicitors
willing to act for them. Their party had done very well in the 1991 elections
and enjoyed (and continues to enjoy) strong public support. Moreover,
Martin Lee is a distinguished barrister and a former chairperson of the Bar
Association. As noted above, he previously had been elected to represent
the entire legal profession in the Legislative Council.
Nonetheless, Martin Lee claimed that eighteen different firms declined
to represent him, reportedly because they did not want to offend former
Justice Li and the Chinese government, and thereby risk losing clients in the
China trade and investment business.83 Martin Lee was originally appointed
by China to be a member of the Basic Law Drafting Committee. But since
June 4, 1989, he has been a major thorn in China's side. He joined in the
protests against Beijing in 1989 and since then has continued to clash with
82. Jonathan Braude, Green about the Hats, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 22, 1995, at 23.
83. See Robin Fitzsimons, Who Will Defend Hong Kong?, THE TIMES, Sept. 7,1993, Features.
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China on transitional matters (such as the drafting of the Basic Law, which
he claimed did not comply with the Joint Declaration).
Lee eventually found a firm that was willing to act for him, but the issue
did not go away. Polls indicated that the controversy had badly damaged the
public's faith in lawyers.' A public seminar was held on the issue.8 5 There
was a call for the Chinese government to assure solicitors that they would not
be penalized if they represented clients who opposed the government.8 It
was also suggested that the Law Society should require solicitors to explain
to the client the firm's reason for refusing to take a case and to prohibit firms
from refusing cases for political reasons.87 This was accomplished, through
an amendment to the Solicitors' Guide which now provides that a solicitor
may not refuse to accept instructions on the basis of the potential client's
political beliefs.8
Perhaps the most. significant result of the controversy, however, is that
it has given the Bar Association additional ammunition in its fight against
fusion of the legal profession. As noted above, barristers work as solo
practitioners and are not permitted to form or join firms. They work on
individual cases and do not develop permanent clients, whose interests might
conflict with those of a new client. Barristers also work according to the
"cab-rank" principle, which means that they must offer their services to the
first client who asks for them and cannot choose cases according to their
chances of success or other personal considerations. 89 As a result, they are
less likely to feel pressure to refuse to represent a client who is unpopular
with the local or national governments. Thus, in Hong Kong the debate over
rights of audience for solicitors has taken on a dimension that would not exist
in other jurisdictions. As one local barrister and academic has noted, the
84. See Public's Faith in Lawyers Falls: Poll, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 1, 1993, at 2.
85. The seminar papers on the debate were published in THE RIGHTToREPRESENTATION (Raymond Wacks
ed., 1993).
86. For example, legislator Jimmy McGregor called upon Lu Ping, the Director ofChina's Hong Kong and
Macau Affairs Office, to reassure solicitors that China "has no objection to cases being taken which
are politically sensitive." See S. Y. Yue, Pledge Sought on Rule of Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Aug. 20, 1993, at 7.
87. Id; see also Robin Fitzsimons, Who Will Defend Hong Kong?, THE TIMES, Sept. 7, 1993, Features.
88. HONG KONG SOLIcrrOR's GUIDE Principle 5.01. Race, color, ethnic or national origins, sex, and
religion are also listed as prohibited grounds for refusing to act. For a general discussion of the issue,
see SANDOR & WILKINSON, supra note 31, at 100-02.
89. BAR CODE, supra note 31, 2 1, states that a "practising barrister is bound to accept any brief to appear
before a Court in the field in which he professes to practise at his usual fee having regard to the type,
nature, length and difficulty of the case. Special circumstances such as a conflict of interest, or the
possession of relevant and confidential information may justify his refusal to accept a particular brief."
For a discussion of the "cab-rank" principle and exceptions to it, see SANDOR & WILKINSON, supra
note 31, at 509-16.
[Vol. 22
1998] Preserving Institutions of Autonomy 363
debate on eliminating the Bar's monopoly has "shifted from the merits of the
proposal to the threat to the existence of an independent Bar."9"
To give the legal profession credit, lawyers have demonstrated a
willingness thus far to take controversial cases since July 1997. For
example, in the recent case challenging the legality of the Provisional
Legislative Council, 9' the Director of Legal Aid (a government department)
declined to brief leading counsel, despite the request of the Court of Appeal
that it do so in view of the important constitutional issues. Fortunately,
barristers Gladys Li, Margaret Ng, and Paul Harris (who were sitting in the
visitors gallery with wigs and gowns ready) offered to assist the court on the
issue of the legality of the Provisional Legislative Council. The court agreed
and expressed its appreciation. 92
In a more recent and ongoing case, many lawyers have offered to
represent children who are eligible for right of abode in Hong Kong under
the Basic Law and are challenging the legality of an ordinance that was
enacted by the Provisional Legislative Council (with the blessing of the
Chinese government) to restrict their entrance into Hong Kong.93
Interestingly, the President of the Law Society issued a circular to all
solicitors firms suggesting that members might assist these children on a pro
bono basis. The circular caused some controversy and some solicitors
queried "why the Law Society had voluntarily committed its members to
fighting against the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region."94 In responding to the controversy, the President of the Law
Society acknowledged the difference between the Law Society and the Bar
-while the Bar had already publicly criticised the ordinance as a violation of
the children's rights, the Law Society was divided on the issue. However,
90. Johannes Chan, To Change or Not to Change: the Crumpling Legal System, in THE OTHER HONG
KONG REPORT 1996, atl9 (Nyaw Mee-kau & Li Si-ming eds., 1996).
91. HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David, [1997] 2 H.K.C. 315 (Ct. App.).
92. HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan, [1997] 2 H.K.C. 315, 321-22 (Ct. App.). The Director of Legal Aid has
been criticized for refusing to grant legal aid in a case of such constitutional significance. See Johannes
Chan,A4micus Curiae andNon-Party Intervention, 27 H.K. L.J. 391,392-93. The incident adds weight
to the long-standing argument that the provision of legal aid should be made independent of the
government.
93. For the first decision in this challenge (by the Court of First Instance, which was formerly called the
High Court), see Cheung Lai wah et al. v. Director of Immigration, [1997] A.L. No's 68, 70, 71 & 73.
The Cotrt of First Instance largely upheld the ordinance, but held that one provision (which
discriminated against children born out of wedlock) violated the Basic Law and was therefore invalid.
For a critique of the decision and the ordinance, see Eric Cheung, Undermining our Rights and
Autonomy, 27 H.K. L.J. 297 (1997). The appeal on the decision is expected to be heard in the Court
of Appeal in 1998.
94. See Anthony Chow, Defending the Right to Defend, HONG KONG LAWYER, Aug. 1997, at 1.
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he wisely urged solicitors to separate their views of the ordinance from their
professional obligations:
[W]e lawyers are under a duty to preserve the rule of law in Hong Kong
and one way of doing so is to ensure that every deserving person be
afforded the opportunity to defend his or her rights. The right to defend
should not be denied because of a lack of means. 95
Still, there is no denying that solicitors who represent the children in
their challenge may be putting their firms at risk of losing certain clients. In
such a climate, there is a strong argument for preserving the divided
profession in Hong Kong, as well as the particular rules that differentiate
barristers from solicitors (such as the rule against partnership and the cab-
rank rule). These rules may appear rather archaic, but they protect barristers
from some of the business pressures affecting solicitors. To that extent, they
help to preserve the independence of the Bar. This not only helps to ensure
the right to legal representation, but also allows the Bar to be a more
assertive critic of government actions that may threaten individual liberties
in Hong Kong.
IV. LANGUAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LINKS
An additional issue facing both academia and the legal profession is the
question of language. As a colony, Hong Kong was required to use English
as the language of both law and higher education. Needless to say, this
imposed significant injustice and hardship. It was only after the signing of
the Joint Declaration that the government finally began the long process of
translating the laws of Hong Kong into Chinese. Thus, until quite recently,
the majority of the people of Hong Kong could not read the laws. 96 Legal
proceedings were also conducted in English and a defendant who did not
speak English had to rely upon a translator to follow his or her own trial.
A person was also required to be fluent in English to sit on a jury, making
juries unduly representative of expatriates and professionals.97 These
injustices reveal some of the weaknesses in Britain's frequent claim to have
95. Id.
96. The first official Chinese translation of a Hong Kong Ordinance was declared authentic in 1992. The
process of translation was not completed until May 1997, six weeks before the transfer of sovereignty.
See CWrNESE DRAFTNG AND TRANSLATION UNIT (Law Drafting Division, Legal Department, Hong
Kong Government); Unprecedented Achievement, HONG KONG LAWYER, July 1997, at 28.
97. See PETER DUFF ET AL., JURIES: A HONG KONG PERSPECTIVE (1992).
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established the "rule of law" in Hong Kong, for accessibility of the law is
one of the most important principles of the rule of law.
Under the Basic Law, both English and Chinese can be used in the legal
system and Hong Kong is now grappling with the difficult task of how to
implement a bilingual legal system. Many lawyers are concerned that the
legal system never will be truly bilingual, but rather an awkward mix of the
two languages. The laws of Hong Kong are now published in both
languages, but the translations are not always perfect (and differences
between the meaning of the Chinese and English versions of a statute have
already been the subject of appeals). Moreover, Hong Kong is a common
law system and many of its principles can only be found in the decisional
law. Although efforts are being made to create textbooks and digests of the
common law in Chinese, it is questionable how well they can really capture
the enormity of the common law. It is also in the interest of Hong Kong to
maintain its links to other jurisdictions and to look to them for new
developments in the common law.
Court proceedings can now be held in Chinese, but many magistrates
and judges still do not speak Chinese. A high percentage of Hong Kong
lawyers are bilingual, but not all of them are comfortable practising law in
Chinese. This is understandable, as they learned their law in English and are
accustomed to practising in English.
The question of language in education is even more controversial.
English is the official language of all the universities in Hong Kong, except
for the Chinese University of Hong Kong (which is considered bilingual).
Many Hong Kong students also attend secondary schools that teach in
English. Yet it has long been argued that Hong Kong students should be
learning in their "mother tongue," as many are failing to learn important
subjects because they are struggling with English. It has also been noted that
many teachers in Hong Kong are not entirely proficient in English. Thus
teachers often use a "mixed mode" in their lessons, despite the fact that their
students are required to write their examinations entirely in English.9"
The Education Commission therefore decided as early as 1990 to move
towards a system in which mother-tongue education would be the norm in
government schools. 99 That decision is now being implemented and the
government has ordered many schools to switch to Chinese (unless the
98. For a discussion of these and other arguments in favor of mother-tongue teaching in Hong Kong, see
David C. K. Cheung, Why Mother-Tongue, in DIFFERENCES AND IDENTITIES: EDUCATIONAL
ARGUMENT IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY HONG KONG (Anthony Sweeting ed., 1990).
99. C. K. Lau, Educators Register Disquiet, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 17, 1998, at 15.
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school applies for and receives an exemption)."0 The government's policy
is probably a sound one, but schools (and parents) are resisting. Many
schools that were denied an exemption from the requirement to switch to
Chinese have appealed the decision.' Some of their objections are quite
pragmatic. For example, teachers claim that all their materials are in
English and while they can speak Chinese, they are not prepared to suddenly
start teaching their subject in Chinese. But other objections are more
emotional. Many schools, parents, and students clearly view being forced
to switch to Chinese as a downgrading of a school's status in the community.
Others have argued that the use of English is an important tradition in their
school, which they should not be forced to abandon. In one letter to the
editor a university student described how she had wept when she learned that
her former secondary school would be forced to give up teaching in English.
Another reason for the resistance to mother-tongue teaching in secondary
schools is the fact that parents and students believe that attending an English
language secondary school is the best way to gain admission to a university
and thus a successful career. 2 Of course, this begs the question-should
mother tongue teaching be brought to the universities as well? It is a difficult
question to answer and this brief discussion cannot do it justice. On the one
hand, English was imposed on Hong Kong by a colonial regime and it is not
the language of most Hong Kong people. On the other hand, English is now
a link between Hong Kong and the rest of the world. The academic
community of our universities is currently considered highly international,
not only in terms of its composition, but also in terms of its activities.
Postiglione's 1993 survey found that a very high percentage of academics
were publishing articles and books abroad, collaborating with academics
from outside Hong Kong, and travelling abroad for conferences, research,
and faculty exchanges. Of course, input from outside Hong Kong (by
foreign academics and students) is also very important to maintaining Hong
Kong's international links and outlook, which in turn help to maintain
academic freedom. Indeed, in Postiglione's view, the "durability of
100. Numerous articles have appeared in Hong Kong on this issue. For three articles that summarize the
debate, see SUNDAY MORNING POST, Dec. 14, 1997, Agenda 1-2.
101. Fourteen of the 20 secondary schools who appealed the decision that they must switch to Chinese were
successful in their appeals and will be allowed to continue to teach in English. See 14 Schools Win
Battle to Teach in English, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 14, 1998, at I. The Government has
offered extra financial support to the schools who are being forced to switch to Chinese. However, it
appears that several schools will continue to lobby for permission to teach in English. See Extra Aid
Fails to Win over Some Schools, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 14, 1998, at 4.
102. Transferring to one of the many private international schools is not an option for most Hong Kong
students, due to the high school fees.
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academic freedom will certainly be related to the degree to which the
academic profession in Hong Kong maintains a viable international
dimension."" 3
The opportunities for global interaction will decrease if Hong Kong's
universities ever switch entirely to Chinese. For this reason, it is likely that
English will continue to play a significant role in higher education, despite
the colonial overtones (and the fact that this makes it harder to persuade
parents of the value of mother-tongue teaching in secondary schools). At the
same time, there will also be increased emphasis on Chinese language skills,
putting ever greater demands on our students. In colonial Hong Kong,
students could afford to slack off a bit on their written Chinese, as the key
to a successful career was English. Now our students are increasingly
expected to be truly bi-literate (Chinese and English) and also tri-lingual
(English, Cantonese, and Mandarin). It is only natural that the same skills
eventually will be expected of their teachers as well.
V. CONCLUSION
Unlike other autonomous regions in the world, Hong Kong does not
represent a racial or religious minority within China. Most Hong Kong
people are Chinese-their ethnic background is substantially similar to that of
people from the rest of southern China. Thus, Hong Kong's claim to the
right to autonomy cannot be based upon the need to protect a minority
culture." Rather, the Hong Kong people are asserting the right to maintain
a way of life that must appear extremely privileged to other Chinese, one
which (ironically) was established while Hong Kong was under the control
of an imperial power."5 Of course, in the long term Hong Kong people
hope that their freedoms will be enjoyed by all of China. But in the short
term they know that this is unrealistic. Thus, Hong Kong is in a very
precarious position: a former colony, reunited with the motherland, expected
to embrace her-yet desperately trying to maintain the differences and the
distance between them.
103. Postiglione, supra note 8, at 262.
104. See GHAi, supra note 7, at 179-84 for a discussion of the extent to which this factor may weaken Hong
Kong's moral claim to autonomy.
105. Of course many of the important reforms under British rule (such as the enactment of the Bill of Rights
Ordinance, the introduction of elected seats in the Legislature, and the repeal of certain draconian laws)
did not occur until after the signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984. Still, even before these reforms,
it is undeniable that the people of Hong Kong enjoyed far more freedom and opportunities than those
across the border in China.
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From the point of view of the Chinese government, the only compelling
reason to grant Hong Kong special status and autonomy is the need to
maintain its economic system. But from the point of view of the Hong Kong
people, much more than just a free market is at stake. They are also fighting
to maintain their social and political freedom. Open debate, critical
education, and an impartial legal system are essential elements of that
freedom. Thus academia and the legal profession have an important role to
play in the effort to maintain Hong Kong's freedoms and way of life.
Hopefully these two professions can rise to the challenge, protect their
independence, and be effective institutions of autonomy in the new Hong
Kong.
